France’s exciting World Cup second-round encounter against Argentina met expectations in that it was a very open and attack-minded game. France started the match with a 4-4-2 shape that also resembled a 4-3-3 depending on the movement of both Kylian Mbappe, who was more-so a wide-forward than a winger, particularly when France were in possession, and Blaise Matuidi, who would from the left-side of midfield, tuck inside to support the midfield pivot of Paul Pogba and Ngolo Kante when France were without possession.
To add, France’s approach can be considered somewhat pragmatic and this is shown through the deployment of Matuidi – a holding-midfielder and clear favourite of coach Didier Deschamps as a left-sided player to add necessary discipline, but this use of Matuidi, as well as the general approach when opposition teams attack, adds organisation to a side that boasts a huge amount of attacking talent.
Argentina made a very significant change to their starting XI from their previous group stage games, in that coach Jorge Sampaoli decided not to start an out-and-out centre-forward. Instead, Lionel Messi occupied a central false 9 role, with Cristian Pavon and Angel Di Maria deployed on the right and left-wings respectively, which offered both pros and cons. Midfield playmaker Ever Banega retained his starting place following an excellent performance against Nigeria. Argentina’s intent from the outset, as it had been throughout the group stages, was to play high up the pitch and to dominate the oppositions half.
Kylian Mbappe’s return to the starting XI, following a rest during the “most boring match of the tournament” against Denmark, was obviously going to occur, but it is still worth pointing out how necessary it was. Mbappe, who played on the right-side, was a threat against Argentina’s very open shape, with the positioning of the defence and in particular left-back Nicolás Tagliafico high up the pitch being taken full advantage, most notable during two excellent counter-attacks; one a great run which led to a penalty and the second being Mbappe’s fine solo effort (a combination of speed, physical strength and technique) to once again give France a lead over the Argentinians. Mbappe’s runs and awareness of space in behind the Argentina defence were met by passes from deeper positions also, with Paul Pogba’s long-distanced releases proving effective against what was a very risky high-line.
More productive passes and movement from France occurred against Argentina in comparison with their previous game – an underwhelming performance against Denmark, and I think that this was because of a) Mbappe starting the match – a conscious decision on behalf of Mbappe rather than a tactical feature and b) Argentina’s poor organisation in their own penalty-box – which was tactical. In contrast, Denmark were very rigid and compact. As a result, crosses from wide areas were more promising.
As alluded to previously, Mbappe really does strengthen France’s counter-attacks with his physical strength when running at alarming speed making use of space. But, perhaps these counter-attacks were enhanced by how poor Argentina were in transition, or is the ability to take advantage of such a weakness a great strength?
Furthermore, France were also very comfortable defensively. Without the ball, France’s shape resembled a 4-4-2, with Blaise Matuidi helping keep the midfield compact against Lionel Messi, who would often drop into the right-half-space to receive the ball and carry from deep. Because of the little space given to Messi further forward, Messi had to drop further down the pitch to receive, and simply playing Messi in a false 9 role found little success. Though the aforementioned role is arguably what suits Messi most and the dropping into deeper spaces would have possibly occurred if Messi played in any other forward position, Messi was far more comfortable on the right-side against Nigeria, for example. France pressed space near to Messi tightly, and this has been an occurrence in every game that has featured Messi at this World Cup.
Argentina also struggled to break down France’s defensive shape, which was high and in unison with the midfield. Wide duels were also won by France’s full-backs, who closed down the wingers – Pavon and Di Maria quickly, and were also very influential in attacks; attacks of this sort came about when Argentina’s defence was deeper; a particular example being the attack from the left-side, which led to a cross eventually leading to Benjamin Pavard who scored and equalised (2-2) excellently . I think it could have helped Argentina if Pavon and Di Maria had switched flanks, as it would have enabled more support of Messi in the centre, and would have given more room for the full-backs to overlap. Because hey did not do this, Argentina’s high-lines in possession offered few pros due to their disorganisation and France’s organisation, but, these few pros were not maximised and Argentina’s attacks were very predictable. Argentina were at times forced to shoot from range, with Di Maria’s superb strike to even out the score-line (1-1) being Argentina’s best moment of the first-half.
Messi’s use of the right-half space proved successful in being in the perfect position to provide an excellent cross for Sergio Aguero to bring the reduce the gap to one goal (4-3). This was Argentina’s best passage of play in my opinion, and shows how the whole team may not need to revolve around Messi, but shows how Messi can find good positions to produce chances.
The final result, 4-3 to France, meant Les Bleus would reach the quarter-finals and would also face Uruguay in what is to be a mouth-watering game. But, does the numerical result of this game truly reflect the gap in performance, as France were far better than Argentina? It does reflect the atmosphere of the match and how eventful and good it was to watch, but does not truly represent the tactical ambiguity of this Argentina side. What interested me about this match was that both sides attacked, which was a contrast from the tactical trend of the whole group stage; defensive tactics being used by organised units (“smaller sides”) against bigger sides that in some cases are evidently at a crossroads, and need to move on from past successes.
The Conventional Playmaker 