In the dying embers of extra-time, Italy scored two goals late, yet brilliant goals, and conquered over Germany in an instant classic World Cup semi-final win. A high tempo affair, Fabio Grosso and then almost straight afterwards Alessandro Del Piero sealed the Azzurri’s fate as they would go on to meet and eventually defeat France to lift their fourth World Cup. Andrea Pirlo was a key figure, winning Man of the Match awards in both games.
During earlier stages of the tournament, Italy had fielded a 4-3-1-2, but by the semi-final, coach Marcello Lippi had his side set-up in a 4-2-3-1, which meant Pirlo was alongside the combative Gernaro Gattuso, also adept in possession, in Italy’s double pivot. And against Germany, Italy were more attack-minded than you might have expected, and dominated possession with 58% in a game that was pretty end-to-end, though lacked much build-up from the back. Pirlo was as ever, however, the creator for an array of chances the Italians created.
Even though Italy had Francesco Totti as the no.10/deep-lying forward positioned in behind centre-forward Luca Toni, Totti had a subdued creative responsibility, with Pirlo having the role of primary creator burdening over his shoulders.
Pirlo instigated attacks from a deep-lying midfield position, and would alternate between dropping closer to the defenders, and shifting ahead of Gattuso into the opposition half. And in either area of the pitch, Pirlo was keen to supply runners from the flanks with passes, including diagonal balls.
These passes from deep made use of the full-backs, Gianluca Zambrotta and Fabio Grosso being a threat on the overlap and the runs from wide midfielders Mauro Camoranesi and Simone Perrotta whilst up against Germany’s 4-4-2. Germany’s shape when without the ball was narrow and although there was less space to play passes between the lines, Pirlo was able to pick out passes into the wide players who had a lot of space to run into.
The full-backs and wide midfielders were the out-ball that would force Germany’s full-backs to push out wide to cover the space and therefore create space inside the penalty-area, which would either force a foul, one being on Camoranesi by Phillip Lahm which in this day and age would have warranted a yellow card, or crosses would be played. But crosses were often intercepted by defenders.
Teammates generally looked to give Pirlo the ball, and the midfielder sometimes tried to get past the German’s midfield line and even play passes in behind their defensive line. But either the run being made was offside (come the hour mark, Italy had eight offsides to Germany’s one), or a German defender would intercept the pass.
Italy aimed to attack quickly from goal kicks or when having regained the ball, and although there was an aim to have Toni hold up possession and bring Totti and others into the attack, and also look for crosses to go into the box, Italy had little fortune with their attacks, even if they were the better side for the entirety of the first-half.
Germany even started the match without the impressive Bastian Schweinsteiger, instead opting for the more disciplined Tim Borowski out on the left of midfield – this was when Schweinsteiger was a winger and had not yet been converted by Louis van Gaal to a world class holding midfielder. This did mean however that left-back Phillip Lahm provided the width when attacking.
But Italy also had their own ways of preventing Germany when defending, too. Like Germany, Italy also defended in two banks of four, with both Camoranesi and Perrotta dropping back to support the full-backs.
And when Germany would attack down the flanks, Italian players would shift to that particular side and close down the space as Germany tried to combine. In one situation, Borowski had stayed back as Lahm made an overlap ahead and as Lahm passed to Lukas Podolski, the forward had less options around him and less space to manoeuvre. Pirlo would then dispossess Podolski and began a counter-attack, but Camoranesi failed to latch on to a pass from Pirlo.
Pirlo did uncharacteristically give away possession which led to Germany’s biggest chance of the first-half, where Bernd Schneider shot over the crossbar. Pirlo could have counted himself lucky, there.
Germany were an improved side in the second-half, but Pirlo was still able to play long range passes, either on the counter or in build-up; in one counter-attack, Toni won the ball and passed to Camoranesi who passed to Totti near the centre-circle. Totti weighed up his options and opted for Pirlo nearby who had drifted across. Pirlo then switched the ball out to Camoranesi who’d made a run down the right, but the wide midfielder miscontrolled the ball.
What this situation does though, is show Italy’s attacking shape rather nicely, and how narrow Germany were when defending.
Though attacks were generally wasted by both sides, and Germany started to grab hold of the game more so, with more chances as the 90 minutes came to a close. Here came extra-time.
And by this point, Italy had made some attack-minded substitutions; Alberto Gilardino’s movement in the box replaced Luca Toni’s target man approach, and Vincenzo Iaquinta was brought on for Camoranesi, a mobile centre-forward for a wide-midfielder. This meant Zambrotta had the right flank to himself, almost, whilst Iaquinta spent more time in the box. Perrotta was replaced by Alessandro Del Piero.
Perhaps the most surprising thing whilst watching the match with hindsight, was how Pirlo wasn’t man-marked, nor was Pirlo pressed by the nearest German player. This was perhaps in case space was exposed in areas closer to the German goal, and less need to cover a player pressing, but it gave Pirlo the room to play passes from deep. Michael Ballack didn’t track Pirlo’s movement as he drifted to receive the ball back from a defender and then played a long pass towards Del Piero.
Pirlo was also able to get closer to Totti now he was pushing a few yards ahead of Gattuso, as Italy attempted to attack inside Germany’s half. Totti often looked to get into small pockets of space, but didn’t have too much space to work with due to the compactness of Germany’s shape. After 117 minutes had passed, it seemed the game would be decided by penalties, but a shot from Pirlo forced a save from goalkeeper Jens Lehmann which resulted in a corner kick.
Del Piero took the corner. It was cleared out and the ball found its way to Pirlo on the edge of the box. Pirlo, slippery like an eel, dribbled his way across in front of the German defenders crowding the box, before finding Grosso with the deftest of defence-splitting reverse passes. Grosso’s first-time shot curved towards the bottom right-corner and gave us one of the most significant moments in Italian football history. Pirlo’s creativity was exemplified and Italy were on the brink of the final.
Italy would double their lead almost instantly, with a fine counter-attack finished off by Del Piero.
In the most vintage of games for Italian football, Pirlo was the creative cog in a side willing to get the best out of him.
Pictures: FIFA TV
Statistics: BBC Sport
It would also be worth having a look at FIFA’s Technical Reports, specifically the two-part report on the 2006 World Cup, which give a detailed overviw on the tactical trends of the tournament, analysis on how goals were scored, whilst also profiling each side.
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